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I. PROLOGUE
It is my extraordinary good fortune to teach and to be the dean
at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i at
Manoa. There are many reasons why this is so, and these reasons
extend far beyond the opportunity to try to shape the future through a
remarkably diverse, hardworking, nice, and impressive group of
students. My sense of being extremely lucky also stretches well past
the regular chance to interact with an unusually cohesive faculty and
staff, warmly supported by alumni and friends of a great Law School.
1 Dean and Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawaii at Mdnoa, I am very grateful for the first-rate research assistance provided
by Daniel Roth and Karen Dunai. I also appreciate the assistance of Emily Bazelon
and Lincoln Kaplan in the course of publication of a much shorter version of this
essay, "The Jazz Man: Charles L. Black, Jr.", LEGAL AFFAIRS (February, 2003).
Though I am particularly thankful for the tolerance and kind help provided by the
APL&PJ staff, I dedicate this essay to a true community of the entire ensemble of
the wonderful, committed students at the William S. Richardson School of Law.
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This Law School almost surely matters more to Hawai'i than
any other law school matters to its home state. This is in part because
Hawai'i actually has the chance to move against the grain of much of
today's dominant legal culture. It may be that island living
underscores the importance of mutuality. Paradoxically, we are also
keenly aware of serving as a crossroads as well as a gathering place.
(O'ahu, the name of this island, is "the gathering place" in Hawaiian.)
Lawyers and law students in Hawai'i seem to understand more than
most of our counterparts that a narrow sense of self-interest and a
focus on the bottom line simply will not do within our interconnected
world.
In Hawai'i, harmonizing powerful pluralistic claims is a
particularly pressing issue. The challenge of finding remedies or
reconciliation occurs against the backdrop of a myriad of uninvited
guests who frequently have behaved badly toward both the host
culture and the strikingly beautiful environment of Hawai'i. And
history seems much closer to the surface here than in most places.
Even lawyers tend to understand that legal problems are primarily
people problems. We are simultaneously blessed and cursed by
intersecting human relationships among people who are likely to be
repeat players, no matter what immediate solutions emerge from their
legal disputes.
The influence of Asia and the Pacific as well as the fragility of
our stunningly inviting environment underscore the importance of
finding legal approaches that offer not only formal rules and
forseeability, but also protection and equity. We must seek justice
along with law, righteousness along with rules.
In seeking to learn something about such matters from the
perspective of a longtime teacher and writer about American
constitutional law and legal history, I have had the pleasure of
reflecting upon a model provided by my teacher and friend, the late
Charles L. Black, Jr. As I hope will become apparent in the essay that
follows, Charles Black also used law and legal ideas to work against
the grain to confront some of the grossest injustices of his time.
In remembering Charles Black, I certainly do not claim that
his work as a marvelous legal thinker, lawyer, and wordsmith even
came close to solving the weighty problems he attacked. I do mean to
assert, however, that his work has much to teach, well beyond his
particular place and time. Charles Black emphasized that words
matter, and that lawyers and judges are obliged to use the powerful
words of our profession in the pursuit of justice. This is the case, even
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if we recognize that we will never get to put our arms around the
justice we are nonetheless obliged to seek.
II. LAW EMPHATICALLY A HUMAN CONSTRUCT
Professor Black had an uncanny ability to identify and to
describe ongoing, current injustices that had become so engrained as
to seem normal and natural to most people. He linked this power of
naming the names of injustice with an unswerving demand that legal
action must be taken to do something now, for the present as well as
for the sake of a better future.
Attending to Black's great legal craftsmanship and his superb
skill as a wordsmith is itself wonderfully instructive. But even more is
to be learned from his vivid understanding that law is a human
construct. Within law, in fact, words have considerable power -
including the power to change what was previously thought to be
immoveable.
Charles Black's work is even more directly relevant to our
new millennium because of his prescient recognition that
governments have affirmative obligations to do the right thing,
particularly on behalf of the most vulnerable. Law, then, ought to be
first and foremost an effective force that is utilized to anchor those
abiding obligations - expressed in grand, ideal promises and
covenants - to assist in the nitty-gritty daily lives of those in great
need of social justice.
In particular, Black's words and deeds speak cogently to the
current constitutional situation in Hawai'i and around the Pacific. We
confront jagged yet basic questions of sovereignty, local autonomy,
and the appropriate role of courts. We also are obliged to try
somehow to remedy past wrongs while also, one may hope,
reconciling deep present differences. Through consideration of how
Charles Black arrived at his singular insights and commitments, it is
possible to build and to extrapolate on a worthy model for social
change.
III. A YOUNG WHITE SOUTHERNER ENCOUNTERS GENIUS IN Louis
ARMSTRONG
When Charles L. Black, Jr. joined the Columbia Law School
faculty in 1947, it was almost inconceivable that a white Texan would
also join the NAACP campaign against segregation. It also seemed to
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defy reality that a professor at a leading law school would proclaim
that, since he had been sixteen years old, "Louis Armstrong has been
a continuing presence in my life."2 Yet with characteristic verve, in
"My World with Louis Armstrong," 3 Black explored the direct
connection.
Unpredictable yet mutually beneficial connections
characterize much of Charles Black's work as a scholar, teacher,
advocate, and exemplar of crucial border crossing between law and
music, and between poetry and potent demands for justice.
Armstrong's jazz genius, Black explained, had a lot to do with why, at
a celebration of the Brown v. Board of Education4 victory held at the
Savoy Ballroom in Harlem in 1955, Thurgood Marshall introduced
Charles to the crowd with these words: "And next over there is
Charlie Black, a white man from Texas, who's been with us all the
way."5
Remembering Louis Armstrong, Black recalled that he first
began to put crucial things together when he went to a dance in
Austin, Texas for "the girls," and he heard Armstrong play. As Black
put it: "It is impossible to overstate the significance of a sixteen-year-
old Southern boy's seeing genius, for the first time, in a black.",
6
Moreover, he connected deepening appreciation of the "quality of
inevitability that so often marks great music",7 with a developing
understanding of the caste system of the South. He came to grasp
"the whole complex net of its senseless cruelties and cripplings, as no
mere accidental grotesquerie of history, but rather as that most
hideous of errors, the prima materia of tragedy, the failure to
recognize kinship."
8
2 Charles L. Black, Jr., My World with Louis Armstrong, 69 YALE REV.
145 (1979), reprinted in 95 YALE L.J. 1595, 1596 (1986).
3 Id. at 1595.
4 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5 My World with Louis Armstrong, supra note 1, at 1595.
6 d
7 1d. at 1598.
8 Id. at 1599.
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The history of Hawai'i, in many respects echoed in lands
across the Pacific, cries out with similar "senseless cruelties and
cripplings." 9 Local caste systems have been similarly anchored to "the
failure to recognize kinship."10 And it is the rare lawyer or small
group of lawyers who, like Charles Black and his compatriots, find
ways to pierce the veil and to utilize law to challenge the
complacency of the legal status quo on such a fundamental issue of
human equity.
Both Black and Armstrong were extraordinary but also lonely
figures. Armstrong was much-criticized when he condemned
President Eisenhower's initial failure to control violent resistance to
school integration in Little Rock in 1957, saying: "Do you dig me
when I say, 'I have a right to blow my top over injustice."' 1 1 Jazz
critic Stanley Crouch wrote of Louis Armstrong: "His freedom, his
wit, his discipline, his bawdiness, his majesty and his irrepressible
willingness to do battle with deep sorrow and the wages of death give
his music a perpetual position in the wave of the future that is the
station of great art." 12 Armstrong put things together in music as no
one else could.
Black, too, made vivid connections and did battle against deep
sorrow, even when his colleagues insisted on pulling things apart.
Both artists beautifully blended what others sought to separate. If
extraordinary craftsmanship and courage in making music can
connect with passionate skill in pursuing justice, Louis Armstrong
and Charles Black, Jr. share significant space that extends well
beyond the mainstream.
9 See, e.g., Jonathan K. K. Osorio, DISMEMBERING LAHUI: A HISTORY OF
THE HAWAIIAN NATION TO 1887 (2002); Ronald Takaki, RAISING CANE: THE
WORLD OF PLANTATION HAWAI'I (1994); Apology Resolution, S.J. Res. 19, 103d
Cong., Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (Joint Resolution passed by
Congress "to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the United States
for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i.").
10 See, e.g., Lili'uokalani, HAWAII'S STORY BY HAWAII'S QUEEN (pap. ed.
1990); David Stannard, HONOR KILLING (2005).
11 Louis Armstrong: A Cultural Legacy, Smithsonian National Portrait
Gallery (2000) available at http://www.npg.si.edu/exh/armstrong/.
12 Stanley Crouch, Time 100: Louis Armstrong at 4, available at
http://www.time.com/time/time 100/artists/profile/armstrong4.html.
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IV. LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 1950s
Through the myths and the mists of a half-century, it has
become nearly impossible to grasp how much fear of judicial activism
dominated American legal education in the years surrounding World
War II, when Black attended Yale and then began to teach at
Columbia. Justice Felix Frankfurter served as exemplar of an oft-
proclaimed institutional principle, "the passive virtues, ' 13 and his
many influential clerks and academic admirers helped lead a nation-
wide celebration of such passivity.
In classrooms, scholarly articles, and the popular press, the
Legal Process school insisted on a self-consciously modest judicial
role. 14 Judges had to remain sensitive to preserving their sharply
limited supply of judicial credibility. It was as if American judges-
particularly federal judges-were players in an ongoing, high-stakes
poker game that pitted law against politics. Judicial credibility chips
were in short supply, it was widely believed, because the chips
already had been distributed appropriately, according to the
comparative institutional advantages and disadvantages of the
branches of government. Unelected judges who seemed to oppose the
will of the majority might legitimately deal only "adequate neutral
principles" - as Columbia's Herbert Wechsler put the point in a
famous 1958 Harvard law review article criticizing the Supreme
Court's activism in Brown. 15 Wechsler argued for a sharp division of
facts from law, procedure from substance, and what is from what
ought to be.
Upon leaving Columbia and returning to Yale to teach in
1957, Black soon found that elite schools, such as Columbia and
Yale, tended to agree with Wechsler generally as they overreacted to
two important legal trends. First, the law schools were anxious to
escape the skepticism about law that the legal realists unleashed
before World War II, a skepticism that easily could be caricatured as
"3 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1961).
14 See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A
View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1999).
15 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (questioning the neutrality, and hence the legitimacy, of
Brown).
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nihilism that cut across the grain of American ideals. Also the
schools sought to repress the tradition of judicial intervention that
repeatedly had struck down progressive legislation in the decades
from the 1890s through 1937.16 According to historian Laura
Kalman, leading academics in the post-war era strove to restore the
belief that the people and not judges would select the rules which
governed the country; that judicial review served to reinforce
representative government; and that the United States again would be
a government of laws, and not of men.' 7 Charles Black resounded to
a different drummer. Throughout his career, he combined legal
realism with text-based claims for judicial activism in pursuit of basic
justice.
When Charles Black died in May 2001, the legal world lost a
unique scholar-activist, a remarkable stylist in deeds as well as words,
and a "miscellanist" without peer. Black further stood out because,
unlike most of his peers, he managed to find and sustain inspiration
within law. He did so despite the fact that he spent much of his
professional life observing and commenting on the disappointments
wrought by the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Presidency. As
Jack Greenberg, a long-time comrade in the work of the NAACP Inc.
Fund pointed out, this was in part because Black was not scared to
lose. 18 Black continued to insist that "skilled and tireless advocacy,
returning again and again to insist on the rightness of its cause, can
make new law."'
19
16 From 1937 until quite recently, the Supreme Court was much more
tolerant of federal intervention in the country's economic and social problems than
it had been before Franklin D. Roosevelt unsuccessfully challenged but then
changed the Court. Compare, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Wickardv. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) with Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
17 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986).
" Jack Greenberg, In Tribute to Charles L. Black, Jr.: Charles L. Black,
Jr., 95 YALEL.J. 1559, 1564 (1986).
19 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46
WASH. L. REV. 3, 14 (1970).
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V. RACISM AND JUSTICE AS THE BUSINESS OF LAW
Black grew up in intensely segregated Texas between the
century's big wars. After his early encounter with Louis Armstrong, it
became absolutely clear to him that "if justice is the business of law,
then, easily and by far, the first item on our law's agenda is and
always ought to have been the use of every resource and technique of
the law to deal with racism.' 20 As a child of the Depression and a
young man during World War II, Black saw little to fear in
government power employed to improve the lot of ordinary citizens.
But he stood apart in his insistence that the ordinary tools of legal
reasoning reveal that fundamental American constitutional law
imposes an affirmative duty on government to protect the rights of all
citizens effectively.
The Civil War Amendments were central to Black's
constitutional faith. He departed radically from most of his
contemporaries in understanding that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments affirmatively promised to protect basic civil
rights. He persuasively argued, for example, the significance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's explicit guarantee of national and state
citizenship as well as its promise to protect privileges or immunities.
Writing and litigating against racism became Black's path to
compelling the United States to ensure meaningful national
citizenship. Black believed that to recognize "the symmetries of
social obligation"-this was one of the phrases with which he
refocused the issue of "state action" in a series of extraordinary
Supreme Court briefs he wrote for the NAACP Inc. Fund in the early
1960s-would improve common life at ground level.2 ' Such
recognition would also serve the country's most profound aspirations.
Once Black got through carefully taking apart the Supreme Court's
decisions in the Slaughterhouse Cases22 and the Civil Rights Cases,23
it became impossible for anyone who read him with care to ignore
20 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69-70 (1967).
21 Brief for Petitioners at 40, Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146
(1964).
21 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
23 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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how the Supreme Court's astonishingly sloppy and crabbed vision of
national rights in these and other decisions contributed to the national
24tragedy of the rise of Jim Crow. Black liked to play variations on a
favorite theme: "We need something better."25 More than any other
constitutional law scholar writing during the last half century, he
made the case for what such a better way to protect human rights
might be.
VI. CELEBRATING ACTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the first of his half-dozen books about constitutional law,
The People and the Court,26 Black swam against what was becoming
a riptide. He had the courage to examine and to celebrate active
judicial review. Black did this during an era that emphasized the
relative competencies of governmental decision-makers and that
assumed that courts ought to conserve their credibility by generally
deferring to more democratically accountable branches. Judges were
to be acutely aware of the constraints inherent in their function as "the
least dangerous branch," a phrase from The Federalist Papers used as
the title of an influential book by Alexander Bickel, a former
Frankfurter clerk who was Black's colleague and friend at Yale Law
School.2 7  (Black explained that he and Bickel "agreed about
everything except our opinions.") 28 Black argued to the contrary that
active judicial review serves most crucially, paradoxically, to
legitimate activity by the government.
24 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED 55-85 (1997).
25 Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights
in the States, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17, 47 (1991).
26 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960).
27 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
28 Black made this crack while teaching at Yale Law School in the 1970s,
as confirmed by the author in a January 6, 2005 conversation with Fred Lawrence,
then a professor at Boston University School of Law and currently dean and
professor at George Washington University Law School.
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This active judicial role, he explained, requires that the
judiciary retain clear power to invalidate the actions of the other
federal branches and the states. When he wrestled with the question
of what judges are to do when asked for their judgments in a post-
legal realist world, Black considered what happens when we realize
that law "has no demonstrable existence outside the facts of life,"29
and also that "law exists as words.' 30  It is crucial that the
Constitution is law, and that law requires interpretation. Unlike
virtually all his white male contemporaries, to Black the
Constitution-read carefully-promises a national regime of human
rights. It obliges us to go to court as well as to Congress, and to
continue to seek to liberate people "from constriction or fear."
31
Black believed this even though, or perhaps because, as someone with
a profound grasp of human nature, he knew the struggle would be
eternal and any success necessarily would be limited.
In addition to noteworthy essays published in Black's honor
when he left Yale Law School to return to Columbia in 1986, Yale
32
and Columbia 33 law reviews simultaneously published vivid memorial
collections. Black taught constitutional law and admiralty at these
two schools for nearly fifty years and he had a way of bringing out the
best in people. Many more law review articles and symposia about
his important scholarly work are scheduled. Black also managed to
be extraordinary in an unusual number of professional roles.
Throughout all of them, he persisted in an often lonely quest to
identify and to implement the pressing possibilities already embedded
in American law. Charles Black possessed a rare quality that he
greatly admired in Chief Justice John Marshall - he was exceptional
for his "sublime audacity" 34 to make better law using the available
basic legal tools.
29 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 26, at 161.
30 Id. at 162.
"' Id. at 88.
32 111 YALE L.J. 1897-1909 (2002).
33 102 COLUM. L. REv. 870-880 (2002). See also "Symposium: Charles L.
Black, Jr.," 92 Geo. L.J. 709, et seq. (2004).
34 I have not been able to retrieve the citation but I am almost certain that
Charles Black used "sublime audacity" somewhere; he might well have
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VII. REASONING FROM COMMITMENT
Black was rightfully famous for doing many very different
things, and for doing them with such originality and panache that the
label "eccentric" stuck early and often. Serious and consistent themes
connected his many roles, however. He celebrated and demonstrated
good lawyering, for example, though doing so remains a surprisingly
rare phenomenon in legal academia. He also repeatedly stepped
outside the commonplace to challenge accepted wisdom with verve.
Yet he anchored the solutions he discovered well within the
craftsmanship available to good lawyers and to practical judges
seeking to be equitable. To Black, law-like other human
institutions-requires commitment of the heart, but at best can claim
only the still uncertain logic of probability. Like Louis Armstrong,
Black embodied vivid originality within constraints.
When Black was over 80 years old, he published an important
final book, A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights, Named and
Unnamed,35  in which he convincingly melded the nation's
commitment to secure the rights of all citizens from the time of the
Declaration of Independence through the Ninth Amendment to the
post-Civil War era's Second Constitution. In the book's Preface,
Charles thanked his wife-Columbia Law School professor and
former dean Barbara Aronstein Black-"for everything." This
expression of gratitude, he said, was simply "one more repetition of a
thought never absent from my heart." 36 This sweet turn of phrase
contains a direct challenge, characteristic of Black, to the classic
dichotomy that separates head from heart. It also serves as a vivid
grace note to his consistent insistence-for over half a century
throughout a remarkably multifaceted engagement with American
remembered the phrase from either Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's "Morituri
Salutamus: Poem for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Class of 1825 in Bowdoin
College," available athttp://eir.library.utoronto.ca/rpo/display/poem1334.html or
from Victor Hugo's "Letter to the London News regarding John Brown," available
at http://www.gavroche.org/vhugo/londonnews.gav.
35 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS,
NAMED AND UNNAMED (1997).
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law-that to think clearly about law requires "reasoning from
commitment."
37
Part of Black's inspiration for radical thought within the
boundaries of law began when he was assigned to teach admiralty and
equity at the beginning of his teaching career. With Grant Gilmore,
Black proceeded to produce two editions-nearly twenty years
apart-of what quickly and lastingly proved to be the leading
American treatise in admiralty, 38 famous for its snappy writing and its
functional rather than doctrinal emphasis. Black's early focus on
practical as well as equitable remedies also became part of a life-long
quest for "reason supporting justice, reason subtly and flexibly
adapting to the gross and fine-grained differences in life."39 Indeed,
Black liked to provide specific examples drawn from admiralty's
expansive sense of jurisdiction and its imaginative concern for the
welfare of seamen. "Having specialized in racism and admiralty," he
wrote, "I have long thought that all we need in legal method, to get all
we need in the field of racial equality-at least so far as a court can
give it to us-is that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments be read in the same spirit as the admiralty clause. 40
Simply put, Black unquestionably was one of the leading
constitutional law scholars of the twentieth century. He was the first
to say many important things so widely accepted now that his
pioneering role has been absorbed into the mainstream, and his
innovating role has been forgotten. For example, he convincingly
demonstrated that attending to the structure and relationship of
constitutional language within the entire constitutional text should be
an essential interpretive approach. Black knew and loved words, so
he insisted on heeding their context. He had majored in Classics at
the University of Texas and initially came to Yale to do graduate
37 Id. at5.
38 GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
(1st ed. 1957) (2d ed. 1975).
39 Once again, I have not found this citation again either, but Black said it
somewhere within his uncanny craftsmanship in weaving the threads between law,
policy, and social concerns.
40 The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, supra note 18, at 17.
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work in Old and Middle English. (He even taught himself Icelandic
when already well into middle age). Knowing the weight of words,
Black repeatedly demonstrated the strength of his contextual
approach. He also decried the pitfalls of narrow textualism for its
false claims to be apodictic truth.
Black also offered appropriate ways to interpret the
Constitution in an imperfect world that now are almost completely
ignored. His work may now be overlooked, but it is not because
Black has been proven wrong. Rather, his ability to cut directly to
essential questions and then to identify the best possible responses
appears to threaten accepted doctrine and methodology. He
challenged the urge toward "normalcy," to doing things as they have
been done. Though he worked well within the parameters of the law,
Black directly challenged the inherently conservative professional
habits of law professors, lawyers, and judges.
VIII. STATE ACTION, FEDERALISM, AND CONSTITUTIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Black asked elemental questions in his work on state action
and federalism. In the 1960s, for example, Black litigated (ultimately
unsuccessfully) a challenge launched by the NAACP Inc. Fund
against the exclusion of blacks from a segregated park left by the
notoriously racist Senator Augustus Bacon in his will to the city of
Macon, Georgia. In his remarkable "Foreword" to the Harvard Law
Review in 1967,41 Black posed a straightforward challenge
concerning what he called the most important problem in American
law. Why, he asked, do we require state action in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment? 42 He demonstrated persuasively why the
search for "state action" is an unduly complicated dead end. To make
proof of state action a necessary precondition for invoking basic
constitutional protections is a costly distraction that makes neither
logical nor historical sense. If anything, however, the state action
restriction has tightened considerably, even in the context of race
discrimination, since Black so cogently litigated and wrote about the
matter in the 1960s.
41 Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, supra note 19, at 69.
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In much of his other work, partially by using as a benchmark
the broad federalism accepted in admiralty law, and more generally
by attending to the structure and relationship inherent in the post-Civil
War amendments, Black offered a powerful critique of the doctrine of
"Our Federalism." In his last book, he was chagrined to find how
extensively recent American constitutional law has been haunted by
the arguments of John C. Calhoun.43 Yet Black remained convinced
that Lincoln's faith in national citizenship rights ultimately had to
prevail rather than the "grisly undead corpse of 'states rights."' 44 A
New Birth of Freedom is a sparkling effort to aid that liberating cause.
Black's concern for the relationships of people centered on
issues of responsibility. His writing about constitutional law focused
repeatedly on core obligations owed to others. This was also central in
his work in admiralty law and equity. It was a resonant theme in his
three books of poetry as well. To Black, it was painfully clear that
racism "defiles our covenant with each other and with the world.,
45
He explained that "separate but equal" and "no state action" are
"fraternal twins" that have served as "the Medusan caratyids
upholding racial injustice. 46  In his decades of work within the
NAACP Inc. Fund team, Black's lawyerly activism sought the basic
legal protection owed the vulnerable as well as the equality promised
to all citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Throughout Black's many books on constitutional
interpretation, impeachment, the death penalty, and Congress, he
never abandoned the internal norms of law and the craftsmanship of
lawyers. 47 But, Black insistently added, "[A]ll law works from level
to level, with commitment to great general principles that have to be
43 A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED,
supra note 34, at 69-85.
44 Id. at 80.
45 Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition, supra note 19 at 70.
46 id.
47 This helps explain, for example, why the short impeachment book he
wrote in the course of one week in 1974 - some say he produced it in a single
weekend - remained the basic reference during another presidential impeachment
crisis several decades later. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK (1974).
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worked into practice through insight and experience.,, 4 8 He saw the
U.S. Constitution as a legal document that enables rather than restricts
the rights of Americans. This view could hardly contrast more starkly
with the dominant approach among a majority of today's Supreme
Court Justices. We live in a time that embraces what Black called "a
myth that lawyers must think small, even meanly, or lose the aura of
professionalism., 49  The classic Black model presents a more
generous but also an intellectually more compelling alternative.
Black's ability to merge a notably hardheaded and critical approach to
legal doctrine with heartfelt empathy provided the foundation for his
brilliant writing.
More than anyone before, Black stressed that the Constitution
was, is, and should be understood to be constitutive; it is neither
accurate nor wise to regard it as a limiting document. In his view, the
Constitution self-consciously launched an experiment in government
intended to afford power and legitimacy sufficient to make that
experiment work for all the nation's citizens. The primary role for
judicial review is to help legitimate the power of government over
time. He dedicated A New Birth of Freedom to "the sacred memory
of Abraham Lincoln,, 50 and he often remarked that it was Lincoln's
path that he tried to follow.5' The connection Black felt to Lincoln
was deep and profound; both were exceptional wordsmiths, both were
dedicated to unfettering freedom through law. To Black, Lincoln
symbolized the importance of recognizing that the Constitution could
be improved, could change - particularly in practical pursuit of the
unfulfilled, bold promises of the Declaration of Independence.
IX. CHARLES BLACK: "INVENTOR OF THE UNIMAGINABLE...
INTERPRETER OF THE PREVIOUSLY INVISIBLE"
48 A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED,
supra note 34, at 36.
49 id.
50 Id. at unnumbered dedication page.
51 Black was pleased to point out that his birthday, September 22, fell on
the anniversary of Abraham Lincoln's promulgation of the Emancipation
Proclamation.
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In addition to his noteworthy professional successes, Black
understood and played the role of unforgettable character with
enthusiasm. So it was wonderful, but not surprising, to hear Black's
unrepentant Texas twang when he played Cicero in a production of
"Julius Caesar" produced by the Yale Repertory Theater in New
Haven. There is some dispute as to whether he even tried to suppress
his accent, but one can just hear Black asking Robert Brustein, the
head of the theater, "Bob, why do you think a first century Roman
would speak with a New York accent?"
In her wonderful memorial essay,52 Charles's daughter, Robin,
described him as "melancholic by nature." 53 His ongoing struggle
against worries, fears, and doubts helps explain Charles Black's
stunningly creative engagement with life. This took many forms;
including conversationalist, poet, painter, harmonica player, actor-
and even as a jogger who looked as if he were about to expire if he
took another step. An indelible image of Charles Black for me is the
way he played his harmonica for my young son.54 Charles, who was
taught to play when he was ten years old by Buck Green, a seventy-
five-year-old former slave whom he said "still plays harmonica
through my mouth,, 55 did not merely wish to entertain. He had
something important to pass on, and a formidable sense of what we
owe our posterity. There was some of Harpo Marx at his best, but the
scene as Charles enthusiastically played for my giggling little boy
somehow was both funnier and more serious than that.
As Robin noted, "He was an inventor of the unimaginable and
an interpreter of the previously invisible. 56  Charles also had a
wonderful instinct for "the strength of symbol when it is backed up by
the real thing. 57 Robin explained how this sense played out in the
52 Robin Black, In Memoriam - Charles L. Black, Jr., 102 COLUM. L. REV.
892 (2002).
53 Id. at 893.
54 Charles Black enthusiastically played harmonica for a very young and
receptive Raphael Moshe Booth Soifer during several visits in the early 1980s.
55 My World with Louis Armstrong, supra note 1, at 1597.
56 Robin Black, supra note 5 1, at 893.
57 Id. at 894.
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quotidian details of Charles's family life, but Charles also applied his
keen instinct to illuminating how law ought to function in the pursuit
of justice. He was a master of the paradoxical and enlightening
juxtaposition, and he employed the text of the Constitution to
annihilate claims of narrow textualism. There is powerful logic that
under girds his basic argument that law cannot and should not be like
logic. By reading carefully and arguing powerfully and with great
originality, Charles Black challenged his readers to ponder whether
the methodology that dominates American constitutional law has even
begun to ask the right questions.
For all his laughter and his zest, Black's work is suffused with
anticipation of inevitable failure. Nonetheless, we should pursue
ideals, he insisted, knowing we will never reach them. Unless we
become skillful in "rational methods available to the art of law,' 58 we
will never begin to achieve the great promises of our foundational
legal documents. To make the effort, to engage with the future as
well as with the past, is quite different from what most of us do. Yet
it is what law is constituted to do. We may be assured, "if we keep
still and listen, that the whole business of decision, of argument, of
long and disappointing search for information and solution, is after all
worthwhile." 59  To Black, we need realism intertwined with the
poetry of law. This entails "the motive for solving problems, the
sacred stir toward justice, our priceless discontent at the remoteness of
perfect law."
60
X. TOUGH LIVING LAW
Black actually delighted in being a contrarian - though he
passionately would have preferred to have his arguments widely
accepted. Unlike many contrarians, however, his intellectual boldness
sprang from deep within the four corners of the ongoing debate. For
example, Black interpreted the Constitution as a text through the use
58 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., ON READING AND USING THE NINTH
AMENDMENT, IN POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS TN HONOR OF
EUGENE VICTOR RoSTOW 187, 189 (M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman, eds.,
Martinos Nijhoff, 1985).
59 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Two Cities of the Law, in THE OCCASIONS OF
JUSTICE, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 17, 31 (1963).
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of customary legal tools. He did not rely on reasoning across
disciplines, on historic revisionism or economic theorizing or the like.
Frequently, in fact, he explicitly sought middle ground, and he almost
always emphasized the importance of context. When Black took on
'judicial restraint," for instance, he understood that he faced the
weight of a powerful slogan. He also conceded that "judicial
deference" is like water or medicine: the concept is simultaneously
indispensable and potentially lethal. But courts also represent the
people, and there is "reality in the belief that courts can and do
approach the task of decision in a way peculiar to themselves." 61 In
our nation's longstanding and ongoing support for the strange
institution of judicial review, Black claimed, "the American
people... can be trusted, because they do not trust themselves."
62
Black warned forcefully against the common tendency to turn
slogans such as "judicial restraint" into a form of idolatry. He had an
uncanny ability to think and write with such breathtaking freshness as
to enact his claim that "the first job of common sense ... is to dust
away a lot of spurious 'common sense' that does not deserve the
name. ' 63  He insisted that any quest for neat binary choices,
mathematical demonstration, and logical proofs does not suit the way
we go about interpreting and applying law. Moreover, we often make
basic mistakes in failing to heed appropriate differences regarding
orders of magnitude.
Black once argued in a well-known Harper's Magazine
64
article, for example, that the right not to be tortured could not literally
be an absolute right. Yet, he claimed, it does not and must not be
allowed to follow that assessing the right to be free from torture is
simply a matter of balancing that right against convenience or comfort
or safety. It matters how you get there. Legal issues do involve
questions of degree, but law also must take matters "down to common
life" in its never-ending pursuit of justice. The goal, he proclaimed, is
61 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 25, at 136-137.
62 Id. at 105.
63 Charles L. Black, Jr., Paths to Desegregation, in THE OCCASIONS OF
JUSTICE, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 149 (1963).
64 Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill
of Rights, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 196 1, at 63.
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"tough living law - law that will listen to reason a long time but will,
in the end, inexorably assert a reason of its own.'
65
Black's love of language and his sense of humor filled his
writing with surprises. For example, no one could previously have
understood fully that the holding in Marbury v. Madison66 was "not
an elephant breaking through Arctic waters with a fish in its mouth.
67
Judicial review already had been around, and even Congress
embraced the notion with repeated and increasing emphasis in the
years after Marbury. Black's wonderful, weird elephant metaphor -
with its antic hints of James Thurber, but also its echo of late-night
conversations with clever, creative friends - served to underscore an
important point of legal realism that, in turn, helped support the
Warren Court's interventions on behalf of basic civil rights.
XI. RECOGNIZING KINSHIP AND THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE OF
LAUGHTER
In The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 68 Black's
famous, unanswerable article defending Brown against its many
distinguished academic critics, he invoked "one of the sovereign
prerogatives of philosophers - that of laughter" 69 to answer the claim
that separate could be equal in America. In retrospect, it is hard to
believe that many leading constitutional scholars offered powerful
critiques of the Brown decision. In addition to Herbert Wechsler's
concern about the Court's departure from neutral principles, skeptics
attacked the Court for not demonstrating sufficient judicial restraint
and for becoming embroiled in a realm that should have been left to
the more political branches of government. Some derided the Court
for its failure to take into account the constitutional freedom of white
citizens to refuse to associate with other citizens when they chose not
to do so.
65 Another elusive citation, almost surely from one of Black's books. See
e.g., supra, note 38.
66 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
67 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 25, at 78.
61 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
69 Id. at 424.
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Powerfully recalling his own experience growing up in Texas,
Black pulverized such claims. He directly attacked the false allure of
formal equality and judicial restraint in the context of segregation.
Black emphasized the well-understood and insidious message within
the unwritten law of segregation: "When you are in Leeville and hear
someone say 'Leeville High,' you know he has reference to the white
high school; the Negro school will be called something else-Carver
High, perhaps, or Lincoln High to our shame. That is what you would
expect when one race forces a segregated position on another, and
that is what you get.",70 He detailed the daily insult and the pervasive
inequality of racial separation, in matters small and large that
necessarily followed. It was a system instituted and continued to
accomplish the "designed and generally apprehended effect of putting
its victims at a disadvantage., 71  And he was hardly timid in
demonstrating that segregation was "set up and continued for the very
purpose of keeping [the Negro race] in an inferior station., 72 Because
"[tihe fourteenth amendment commands equality, and segregation as
we know it is inequality, 73 Black declared that the Court's judgments
in Brown were as "right and true as any that ever was uttered.,
74
"[T]he failure to recognize kinship" 75 is devastating and tragic,
and courts must say so. Indeed, Black later insisted, "public insult by
law is, without more, a denial of 'equal protection ...,, Segregation
could not fit the promise of American law-and it clearly had to be
dismantled through law. To Black, however, academics are often
"self-vaunting." They tend to protest too much about their personal
opposition to racism, for example, while claiming that it is a detached
and principled commitment to neutrality that requires them to criticize
70 Id. at 425.
71 Id. at 428.
72 The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, supra note 67, at 424.
73 Id. at 428.
74 Id. at 430.
75 Paths to Desegregation, supra note 62, at 160.
76 Charles L. Black, Jr., THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON
LAW Vii (1963).
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decisions such as Brown as they look on from above the fray. Such
elusive abstractions evaporated in the sunlight of Black's talent for
crisply capturing underlying harsh reality. In contrast to lessons about
racism learned from life on the ground or from a soaring trumpet,
legal arguments offered by those who pride themselves on "espousing
arguments that lead to unpleasant conclusions" run the risk of playing
"the most dangerous of games-that of defrauding ourselves." 
77
That game is immensely popular today. Indeed, a puzzle may
help us grasp why in the future the work of Charles Black almost
certainly will be regarded as more influential than it is today-an era
when we seem to relish self-interest as both explanation and goal in
law. The dilemma: How did such a great practical lawyer-and a
committed, clear-thinking realist - remain an optimist, even an
idealist, about law? After his own close, astute, and critical
observation of the United States Supreme Court, for example, how
could Black remain uncynical and continue to be surprised by the
shoddy work product and the grievous deficits in both mercy and
justice to be found permeating the opinions of the Justices?
Part of the answer may be found, I think, in Charles' comfort
in living with contradictions and within paradoxes. In the 1950s,
Charles gave a commencement speech to high school students that
focused on the irresolvable ways in which "the world is a place of
contradiction and mystery." 78 To be fully human, Charles explained,
"is to live to the fullest measure both in the society that is the essence
of humanity and in the loneliness that is the essence of humanity,
somehow trying to treat each as though it were everything. 79
Another part is anchored in Charles' magnificently humane
imagination. His far-reaching qualities of empathy and understanding
made it very hard for him to believe that there are so many judges
who lack adequate imagination, humanity, and a sense of justice and
mercy. Charles kept the faith - despite all the miscarriages of justice
he saw and understood as such - that the usual lawyer's tools of
presumptions, preponderance of the evidence, close reading, attention
77 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 25, at 100.
78 Charles L. Black, Jr., Commencement Address, Storm King School, in
THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 207 (1963).
79 Id. at 212.
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to context, cogent argument, and the like ought to and frequently
would prevail.
Indeed, this deep belief may help explain why Charles was not
sympathetic when some of us made trouble as law students in the late
1960s, challenging law schools as well as the Viet Nam war and other
injustices. In retrospect, it seems clear that he thought we ought to
learn how to utilize the weapons of the law, rather than to reject them
before we even fully understood our target. On the other hand, more
than other professors at the time, Black advised us not to be ground
down by law. He went so far as to assure us that we could survive
and not be crushed even by law school. For many of us, listening to
Louis Armstrong records and to Charles' conversation during his
annual Louis Armstrong Night ranked high among the most
memorable moments in our legal education.
Charles displayed a wonderful mix of down-to-earth
practicality and dreaminess that somehow uncomplicated abstractions
and made the pursuit of justice an immediate, real possibility. As he
put it: "We talk about the protection of our fellows from the suffering
and indignity of want as though it were a matter of taking Mount
Rainier under one's arm and jumping over the Pacific Ocean, when in
fact it is a matter of deciding whether or not to help a frail person lift
something that we can ourselves lift."80
So long as a frail person needed help to lift something and one
is able to provide that help, there could be no cynicism and no
withdrawal. Charles had a keen understanding of human frailty, and
he led the way as he elegantly and forcefully described an ongoing
obligation to do some heavy lifting through law. This included the
past, to be sure, but Charles emphasized change. With optimism, he
willed a focus on the future.
We have much to learn about remaining undefeated by
injustices within law as it now stands. Often the inequitable status of
the status quo seems particularly egregious in Hawai'i and across the
Pacific. Yet if anything, this underscores the importance of crucial
lessons taught by Charles Black about the need for judges and lawyers
to combine creativity, craftsmanship, and committed courage.
80 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., The Humane Imagination in the Great Society,
in THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 1, 10 (1986).
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XII. MIND AND HEART: "THE BRINGING DOWN TO EARTH OF JUSTICE
TEMPERED BY MERCY"
The winter before Charles died, I had occasion to visit him.
By then, his long illness had weakened him substantially, and he was
sleeping much of the time. It took hours to help him get ready for a
visitor. I found him propped up, but sitting in a chair, chain-smoking
cigarettes because it didn't matter anymore. He still had his
handsome, soulful, dry riverbed look, and his dark eyes flashed as he
spoke with passion and laughed about the rampant folly in the world.
We both knew this was likely to be our last encounter, so there was
more philosophizing than usual.
It was a memorable visit during which Charles was cogent and
vehement as he echoed several of his enduring themes and metaphors.
He explained that he had "made a career of building an edifice around
the obvious." 81 He added that he was particularly pleased by the
favorable reviews of A New Birth of Freedom, explaining that he was
"too old to try to suppress vanity" about the book, published in his
eighties, that was "written for all our grandchildren." Mostly,
however, Charles wanted to discuss the intricacies of the presidential
election recount and the litigation surrounding it. He was passionate,
partisan, up-to-date, and appalled. As we parted, Charles lifted his
arm in a grand farewell salute, and declared, "The mind is still strong,
and so is the heart." 82 Reasoning from commitment remained his vital
theme.
As a lawyer, scholar, teacher, conversationalist, wordsmith,
dreamer, and as a complex, engaging, and wonderfully different
human being, Charles Black, Jr. personified an enduring, deep
commitment to the active pursuit of law realizing equity. To make
law intensely practical, he believed some people must do theory. It
was, he said, crucial not to be fooled by "vulgar false practicality" in
the course of "a tough practical job to work at - the bringing down to
earth of justice tempered by mercy." 83
81 Our last visit was December 4, 2000. It was so poignant and yet
encouraging that I took the rare step of writing down some notes immediately
thereafter, a copy of which is on file with the editors.
82 id.
8, Charles L. Black, Jr., A Tribute to Jerome Michael, in THE OCCASIONS
OF JUSTICE, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 204 (1963).
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Throughout his career, Charles stated repeatedly that no
"waxen simulacrum"84 could be allowed to take the place of our
Nation's longstanding, fundamental promises guaranteeing human
rights. Those promises required combining a keen ear for what is
basic with an ability to innovate, as well as a sense of audience and a
healthy dash of showmanship, too. Charles taught and exemplified
law as an art, and he viewed the world as a poet. In his embrace of
the art and soul of law, he merged the legal dancer and the dance with
unprecedented forceful grace.
Charles Black did tough practical law jobs as they never had
been done before because as a poet he knew the accuracy and power
of metaphor. For Charles, the law is a metaphor of how life is
supposed to be. "The Two Deals," a poem in The Waking
Passenger,85 one of Charles' three books of poetry, concludes:
"Everywhere is a prisoner.' 86 But another poem in the same
collection ends: "Act love/Imperfectly; you will remember love
itself.
87
XIII. CONCLUSION: VISIONS ACROSS OCEANS
The late Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai once said, "A poet's
state of mind is seeing the world with a kind of double exposure,
seeing undertones and overtones, seeing the world as it is. ' ' 88 Charles
Black, Jr. saw the world as it is. With indomitable flair, his
remarkable riffs worked to change it.
It is no exaggeration to note that the beauty and importance of
language is more evident in Hawai'i than in the continental United
States. And the empathetic power of music that linked and changed
the lives of Charles Black, Jr. and Louis Armstrong is also potent and
84 A NEw BIRTH OF FREEDOM, supra note 34, at 78.
85 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE WAKING PASSENGER (1983).
86 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., The Two Deals, in THE WAKING PASSENGER 77
(1983).
87 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., Letting Go, in THE WAKING PASSENGER 12
(1983).
81 Mel Gussow, Yehuda Amichai, Poet Who Turned Israel's Experience
into Verse, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, September 23, 2000, at Obituaries, A 14.
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profound within these beautiful islands. Through these and other
means, people in Hawai'i and across the Pacific may be more open
than most to sense undertones and overtones and thereby to "see the
world as it is. '89 As well as rewarding subtle sensibility, such acute
perception imposes a deep obligation, perhaps even more upon
lawyers than on most people. We are challenged to delve beneath
"false practicality" and instead to perform what Black aptly described
as the "tough practical job .. .the bringing down to earth of justice
tempered by mercy."
In dealing with different laws and legal systems across Asia
and the Pacific, we wrestle continually with jagged practicalities in
the struggle for real equality. Yet it is also crucial to make "proper
discriminations between things essentially different." 90 And we
cannot forget the basic obligations that are imposed by human
kinship, reflected by law at its best. Indeed, committed lawyers are
key to unlocking past wrongs while also pursuing mutual liberation
that points us towards a better future. 91 As Charles Black taught and
exemplified: "Law is and forever will be technicality. But law is also
insight and wisdom and justice. 92
'9 The Hawaiian word "kaona," for example, is defined as "hidden
meaning as in Hawaiian poetry" or "words with double meanings that might bring
good or bad fortune." Mary K. Pukui & Samuel H. Elbert, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY
(rev. ed. 1986).
90 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 25, at 221.
9' John Osorio's final chapter, "Ho'oulu Lahui," cogently connects the
problematic power of law and the vital role of kinship in Hawai'i. Osorio,
DISMEMBERING LAHUi, supra note 8, at 250-60. Eric Yamamoto, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999)
offers glimmerings of hope even for the difficult work of future reconciliation.
92 THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, supra note 25, at 182.
